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Abstract 
This exploratory inquiry interrogates the impact of electoral engineering reforms 
through synchronized automated elections in a Philippine context suffering from 
systemic corruption. The May 2010 elections heralded a watershed in electoral 
processes and practices. Results of local (congressional) and national (senatorial, vice-
president and presidential) elections were obtained nearly overnight. The elections 
dramatically altered the mode of Philippine elections: typified by arduous and onerous 
delays in announcing results stretching all the way to several months after elections. 
Although violence still marred the elections, it was relatively one of the more peaceful 
elections ever experienced. This inquiry attempts to explore the impact of this 
unprecedented electoral reform to political competition, allegations of corruption, the 
prevalence of patron-client networks, the influence of media and the political fortunes 
of candidates who supported electoral automation. Using data obtained from the 
elections, this inquiry proposes analytical models in understanding changes and 
continuities in election reforms and corruption in determining outcomes – individual 
votes garnered during the elections.  
 
Keywords: Patron-client; elections; automation; Philippines; corruption. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This inquiry
 
attempts to explore how the unprecedented electoral 
engineering reforms represented by the May 2010 elections made an impact on 
                                               
  Vicente Chua Reyes, PhD, is Lecturer with the School of Education, University of 
Queensland, Australia. Trained as a political scientist, his current research interests are in 
educational leadership, young people’s conceptions of political interest and civic 
participation. He also pursues research inquiries into the impact of Information 
Communication Technology (ICT) to education, issues of corruption and bureaucratic 
governance and reforms (vicente.reyes@uq.edu.au). 
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political competition, allegations of corruption, the unprecedented automation 
of elections, the prevalence of patron-client networks the influence of media and 
the political fortunes of candidates. A premise made in this article is that in a 
Philippine context, the bureaucracy in general, and represented in this inquiry, 
by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is dysfunctional
1
 and that 
corruption has an “ubiquitous impact”2 on governance and administration. So 
serious is the malaise of corruption and its linkage with elections that the Asia 
Foundation has identified that one of its key development programs in 
countering corruption and one of the specific strategies it pursues is helping 
establish “Free and Fair elections”3. Scholars and practitioners of Philippine 
anti-corruption have often considered that the automation of elections is an 
effective means to curb corruption
4
. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and 
the Philippine government in its governance assessment reports have advocated 
for election reforms, a vital component of which is automation
5
. The 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) in its 2009 Philippine 
Electoral Reform document stated that “automation is seen by many in the 
Philippines as a cure-all for the election woes of the country and its failure 
would have wide-reaching consequences”6. This article views the May 2010 
automation of elections as an appropriate example of electoral engineering, the 
practice of changing formal electoral rules in order to “generate major 
consequences by altering the strategic behaviour of politicians, parties and 
citizens”7. Being unprecedented, the conditions surrounding the May 2010 
elections are quite unique. For purposes of this exploration, this inquiry tests the 
                                               
1  Vicente Reyes, "Case Study of Implementation Amidst Corruption Linkages: The 
National Textbook Delivery Programme (Tdp) of the Philippine Department of 
Education", Journal of Educational Policy 24, no. 4 (2009). 
2  Vicente Reyes, "Corruption and Policy Implementation in the Philippines: A Comparative 
Analysis of the Teacher Training and Textbook Delivery Programmes", Asian Journal of 
Political Science, vol. 15, no. 1 (2007). 
3  The Asia Foundation, "Asia Foundation Programs in the Philippines", San Francisco, 
USA, The Asia Foundation, 2011, p. 273. 
4  Teresita Angeles, "An Anti-Corruption Strategy for the Philippines", in Asia Pacific 
School of Economics and Management Working Papers, Canberra, Australia, Australian 
National University, 1999; Michael Johnston, "Political and Social Foundations for 
Reform: Anti-Corruption Strategies for the Philippines", Manila, Philippines, Asian 
Institute of Management, 2010. 
5  Asian Development Bank., "Country Governance Assessment", Manila, Philippines, 
Asian Development Bank, 2005; National Economic Development Authority, "Updated 
Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan 2004-2010", Manila, Philippines, National 
Economic Development Authority, 2009. 
6  International Foundation for Electoral Systems., "Philippines Election Reform Project", in 
Ifes Final Project Report ed. USAID, Washington, D.C., International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems, 2009, p. 15. 
7  Pippa Norris, Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior, Cambridge, 
UK, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 8. 
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effectiveness of this electoral engineering reform initiative by using number of 
votes, as the main outcome variable for the very cogent argument that votes can 
be used to approximate changes in the behaviour patterns of politicians, parties 
and citizens. 
Elections considered as one of the core tenets of democracy has been 
identified as an arena where anti-corruption efforts need to be intensified. 
International, multilateral agencies as well as the Philippine government itself, 
pursuing anti-corruption initiatives have built their reform agenda on the pillars 
of ensuring that elections are free (defined as voters having “the opportunity to 
participate in the election without coercion or restriction of any kind”) and fair 
(“a level playing ground for all candidates”)8.  
This inquiry interrogates the changes and continuities that have typified 
election reforms in the Philippines. It attempts to examine the extent of political 
competition (i.e. free and fair) that has emerged from the 2010 automation 
election reform. Focusing on the Philippine’s National Capital Region (NCR) as 
an exploratory case study, this probing examination sheds light on electoral 
contests for positions in the Upper House (Senate) of the Philippine Congress 
(see Table 1). This exploration is naïve as it offers “no sophisticated theory of 
voting, rigorously tested in a statistical model”9. This article attempts to explore 
possible explanations to the puzzle of candidates garnering a lion’s share of 
votes, notwithstanding proven convictions or even serious allegations of 
corruption. The initial section describes the Philippine context where systemic 
corruption exists alongside Philippine elections. The succeeding section 
interrogates the dominant theoretical framework that has typically been 
identified as the explanation for the conundrum of Philippine electoral politics. 
The latter half of the inquiry undertakes a cross-sectional, non-experimental 
analysis that posits preliminary models formulated as attempts to explain 
Philippine electoral puzzles. These models are then used as initial discussion 
points for a more nuanced – and optimistically a more insightful paradigm – 
into making sense of the issues and challenges brought about by election 
reforms amidst systemic corruption within the Philippine electoral system. This 
article posits that an analysis of Philippine politics must necessarily investigate 
the interplay of corruption and the implementation of vital policies.
10
  
 
                                               
8  Jorgen Elklit and Palle Svensson, "What Makes Elections 'Free and Fair'?", Journal of 
Democracy, vol. 8, no. 3, 1997, p. 35. 
9  Michael Lewis-Beck and Tom Rice, "Forecasting Presidential Elections: A Comparison 
of Naive Models", Political Behavior, vol. 6, no. 1, 1984, p. 10. 
10  Vicente Reyes, Corruption and Implementation: Case Studies in Philippine Public 
Administration, Quezon City, National College of Public Administration and Governance, 
University of the Philippines, 2009. 
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Table 1. Final Results Senators May 2010 Philippine Elections (Only top 12 qualify 
as Senators) 
Source: (Commission on Elections, 2010). 
 
 
The Philippine Context: 
Electoral Engineering And The Case Of The  
May 2010 Automated Election System (AES) 
 
The continuing effort of the COMELEC to reform the Philippine 
electoral system is an example of electoral engineering. Modifications of 
current electoral systems can be described as processes in which the vital 
democratic principles where “consent and representation are translated into 
reality” through a systematic “method of converting votes cast by electors into 
seats in a legislature”.11 Electoral engineering is resorted to in order to maintain 
and preserve people’s trust in electoral exercises. Achieving trust or what the 
literature refers to as electoral integrity, is vital as it accomplishes two essential 
democratic principles: “popular acceptance of the outcome” of elections and the 
consolidation of the “authority of elected officials and the government”.12 In the 
Philippine case, one can argue quite compellingly that the chronic incidences of 
“electoral malpractices are predicted to undermine feelings of political 
legitimacy, eroding citizen’s confidence in the electoral process and electoral 
authorities”.13 The AES as it was implemented for the May 2010 elections is an 
example of electoral engineering where the rules (in electoral engineering terms 
this is also referred to as structure) were modified in order to bring about a 
                                               
11  Vernon Bogdanor, "Introduction," in Democracy and Elections Electoral Systems and 
Their  Political Consequences, ed. Vernon Bogdanor and David Butler, Cambridge, UK, 
Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 1. 
12  Pippa Norris, Electoral Engineering: Voting … cit., p. 15. 
13  Ibidem. 
Candidate Party Affiliation Votes 
Bong Revilla  Dominant Majority (LAKAS-KAMPI) 19,513,521 
Jinggoy Estrada  Accredited Party (Partido ng Masang Pilipino) 18,925,925 
Miriam Defensor 
Santiago  Accredited Party (Partido ng Repormang Pilipino PRP  17,344,742 
Franklin Drilon  Dominant Minority (Liberal Party) 15,871,117 
Juan Ponce Enrile  Accredited Party (Partido ng Masang Pilipino-PMP) 15,665,618 
Pia Cayetano  Accredited Party (Nacionalista Party-NP) 13,679,511 
Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.  Accredited Party (Nacionalista Party-NP) 13,169,634 
Ralph Recto  Dominant Minority (Liberal Party) 12,436,960 
Vicente Sotto III  Accredited Party (National Peoples’ Coalition-NPC)  11,891,711 
Sergio Osmeña III  Independent  11,656,668 
Lito Lapid  Dominant Majority (LAKAS-KAMPI) 11,025,805 
Teofisto Guingona III  Dominant Minority (Liberal Party) 10,277,352 
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different set of incentives that could possibly modify political behaviour of all 
stakeholders involved (in electoral engineering terms, this also referred to as 
culture). Norris contends that the convergence of structure and culture necessary 
for changes to happen via electoral engineering is full of uncertainty:  
 
Essentially, rational-choice institutionalism assumes that formal electoral rules 
have a substantial impact upon the strategic incentives facing politicians, parties and 
citizens, so that changing the formal rules has the capacity to alter political behaviour. Yet 
it remains unclear how much formal rules and strategic incentives matter in comparison 
with deep-rooted cultural “habits of the heart” arising from the process of societal 
modernization; and we know even less about how structure and culture interact14.  
 
But does electoral engineering really bring about changes in the structure 
and culture of electoral practices? If one goes by the record of established 
democracies, there is not enough to go by. In the last fifty years, “only six cases 
of major reforms”15 have been carried out in established democracies. The 
reason for the rarity can be traced to political will (or the lack of it). The 
decision to adopt electoral engineering as a major reform initiative is usually 
made by politicians who “usually control the electoral system and those 
politicians with the power to change the system are typically precisely those 
who benefit from it and therefore want to keep it unchanged”16, Owing to the 
paucity of electoral reform examples, the Philippine AES thus becomes a 
unique case. This exploratory article investigates the implementation efficacy of 
the AES as an electoral engineering reform initiative. 
 
 
Obstacles To Political Reform – Electoral Distortion 
 
In an asymmetrical relationship, the variable affecting change is the electoral 
distortion characterized by the Filipino behaviour of patrimonialism as exemplified by 
patron-client relationship, personalism, money politics, pakikisama（camaraderie）
system and utang na （debt of gratitude）that transforms the government into a weak 
state of equilibrium of corrupt rent seeking motives as the consequent variable17.  
 
In a situation where asymmetrical relationships seem to determine 
distortions in Philippine elections, much needed change particularly in curbing 
corruption becomes absolutely vital: Given the high-stakes nature of electoral 
                                               
14  Ibidem, p. 6. 
15  Alan Renwick, The Politics of Electoral Reform: Changing the Rules of Democracy, 
Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 10. 
16  Ibidem. 
17  Luisito Villanueva, "Philippine Electoral Distortion and Perpetuation of Corruption in 
Government", Forum of International Development Studies, vol. 21, no. 3, 2002, p. 62. 
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spoils, “reformers need to reclaim the original justification of campaign finance 
reform: not as a guarantor of structured democratic deliberation before the 
election, but as an effort to assure that certain powerful groups do not exercise 
undue influence on its outcome”18. It has been argued that in Philippine politics, 
the elites or entrenched political clans perpetuate their “patrimonial 
connections”19 and their stranglehold on power through elections20; thus, 
electoral reform must be designed as “protecting against any one powerful 
group accumulating too much influence over the nation’s politics”21.  
Reforming the electoral system as well as reviewing the highly 
centralized unitary state and presidential form of government and the prevailing 
party system become imperatives in achieving political transformation
22
. 
Moreover, these critical areas of election reform have long been recognized by 
scholars and practitioners as fundamental in overhauling Philippine politics. 
Two powerful deterrents to much-needed wholesale reform particularly in the 
area of election distortion persist as daunting obstacles: the monopoly of elites 
and the high cost of popular participation.  
The current electoral system particularly for the nationally elected 
office of member of the house of senate (Senate) and the locally elected office 
of member of the house of representatives (Congress) restrict current legislators 
to “three consecutive rather than three terms in a lifetime” allowing “entrenched 
political families” to be able to manipulate and cycle their way “between 
national and local offices”23. Thus, the election for legislators is a merry-go-
round, allowing political dynasties to grow, be fostered and to be continually 
resurrected. Several attempts have been made to address these weaknesses. 
Examples of these would be the introduction of party-list elections, which 
would have allowed greater popular participation, and representation and a 
move away from favoring entrenched elites. However, the staunch and stubborn 
resistance of members of congress aligned with elites led to the unfortunate 
debacle of “the 1998 party-list elections manifesting the great extent to which 
legislators sabotaged reform efforts”24. The 1998 local elections – as usual 
                                               
18  Frank Pasquale, "Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory of Campaign Finance 
Reform", University of Illinois Law Review, no. 2, 2008, p. 601. 
19  Shamsul Haque, "Theory and Practice of Public Administration in Southeast Asia: 
Traditions, Directions, and Impacts", International Journal of Public Administration, vol. 30, 
no. 1, 2007, p. 1315. 
20  Julio Teehankee, "And the Clans Play On", in Philippine Center for Investigative 
Journalism, Quezon City, Philippines, Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 
2007. 
21  Frank Pasquale, "Reclaiming Egalitarianism … cit.", 602. 
22  Kent Eaton, "Restoration or Transformation? 'Trapos' Versus Ngos in the 
Democratization of the Philippines", The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 62, no. 2, 2003. 
23  Ibidem, p. 482. 
24  Ibidem, p. 486. 
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turned to patronage politics -- disregarding policy, thus “many local officials” 
ignored “the local bodies on which Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) 
sit” effectively making the party-list system in 1998 inutile. The cycle of 
election distortion specifically for positions in the Senate and Congress is 
perpetuated where “the high cost of getting elected serves as a disincentive for 
popular participation and an incentive for corruption”25.  
However, for the highly-coveted national post of President, the reform 
trajectory has been different: “The Philippines is the only presidential 
democracy in the world using a plurality-rule electoral system to select its chief 
executive that has experienced a dramatic change in that system”26. One of the 
aftermaths of the 1986 EDSA Revolution
27 
and as a harsh reaction to the two-
decade reign of Marcos punctuated by a disputed re-election and a declaration 
of martial law was the institutionalization of term limitations (one-term) for the 
President, enshrined in the 1986 Philippine constitution. This electoral reform 
complemented with the plurality-rule system has engendered a unique variant of 
individualistic patron-client relations:  
 
First, the single-term limitation increases the effective number of candidates in 
plurality, rule-based elections because none of the individuals running has the 
incumbency advantage. Such a limitation significantly lowers the cost of loss since a 
loser in one election is granted another opportunity to run soon. Third, it shortens the 
cycle of elite circulation as a greater number of persons will have served as president in a 
given period. Fourth, the time horizon of the players in presidential contests shortens, 
making it more difficult to coordinate candidacies. In general, shortsighted players find it 
harder to cooperate with one another or create strong comradeship. Under plurality rule 
with a single-term limitation, prospective presidential candidates have a strong incentive 
to campaign independently instead of joining forces with other candidates28.  
 
Electoral reforms designed to dismantle the monopoly of the elites and 
lessen the costs of popular participation have achieved mixed results. The elites 
still operate and lord it over the presidential derby. But the May 2010 elections 
saw an increase in the number of presidential candidates not necessarily coming 
from the elites. This increase in the number of candidates for President cannot 
be solely attributed to the lowering of costs for popular participation but is 
“more likely to be related to a failure of national level elites to coordinate with 
                                               
25  Julio Teehankee, "Electoral Politics in the Philippines", in Electoral Politics in Southeast 
and East Asia, ed. A. Croissant, G. Bruns, and M. John, Singapore, Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung, 2002, p. 195. 
26  Jungug Choi, "Philippine Democracies Old and New: Elections, Term Limits, and Party 
Systems", Asian Survey, vol. 41, no. 3, 2001, p. 488. 
27  EDSA stands for Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, the major arterial road in Metro Manila 
that was the site of the peaceful 1986 revolt that effectively forced out the late President 
Ferdinand Marcos from power and towards his exile in Hawaii. 
28  Jungug Choi, "Philippine Democracies Old and New: Elections, Term Limits, and Party 
Systems", p. 499. 
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one another”29. Using a patron-client framework, one may conclude that 
Philippine elections are still dominated by elite interests. However, this inquiry 
proposes that these dominant paradigms may be too limited and may not be able to 
capture some of the more important nuances occurring in Philippine elections. 
This inquiry contends that patron-client relations in the tradition of 
Lande
30
  is still present and has actually become even more prominent in 
contemporary times
31
. Recent Philippine studies have reaffirmed the 
continuance of patron-client ties. In an empirical study measuring the linkages 
between influential local and national level politicians, Ravanilla and Hicken 
argue that in the Philippines “maintaining ties with local elites has been shown 
to be an effective channel for upper level politicians including senators to 
mobilize electoral support”32. Recognising the fragmentation of Philippine 
politics, Querubin’s empirical research contends that “political dynasties 
emerge as the natural unit of political organization in democracies where 
political parties traditionally have been weak”33.  
 Moreover, patronage politics by the previous Ferdinand Marcos regime 
described as plunder
34
 and crony capitalism
35
 act as a powerful predictor 
determining electoral outcomes. Intriguingly, prominent figures clearly aligned 
with the corrupt Marcos regime have successfully established a remarkable 
comeback during the May 10 national and local elections: Ferdinand Marcos, 
Jr., was elected a first-time member of the Philippine senate, Ms. Imee Marcos, 
the eldest daughter of the late Marcos strongman, was elected as Governor of 
the Province of Ilocos Norte and last but certainly not the least, Madame Imelda 
Marcos who to date has not been convicted of any of the 910 corruption cases 
filed against her
36
, was elected into the Philippine congress representing Ilocos 
                                               
29  Ibidem, p. 497. 
30  Carl Lande, "Leaders, Factions and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics", in 
Monograph Series No. 6, Southeast Asia Studies, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 
1965. 
31  Amado Doronila, "The Transformation of Patron-Client Relations and Its Political 
Consequences in Postwar Philippines", Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol. 16, no. 1, 
1985. 
32  Nico Ravanilla and Allen Hicken, "Bringing Home the Pork When Home Is the Entire 
National Electorate: Reelection Incentives of Senators of the Philippines" (paper 
presented at the APSA 2012 Annual Conference Meeting, New Orleans, 17-19 February 
2012), p. 24. 
33  Pablo Querubin, "Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political 
Dynasties in the Philippines" (paper presented at the APSA 2012 Annual Conference 
Meeting, New Orleans, 17-19 February 2012), p. 27.  
34  Belinda Aquino, Politics of Plunder: The Philipppines under Marcos, Quezon City, Great 
Books, 1987. 
35  John Andrews, "From Riches to Rags: Corruption and Cronysim in the Marcos Era", in 
The Economist, 1988. 
36  Jim Gomez, "Imelda Marcos Sure She'll Beat Corruption Charges", The Associated Press, 
3 July  2009. 
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Norte. But perhaps the most stunning development in the May 10 elections was 
the uncanny performance of ex-president Joseph Estrada convicted of plunder 
and subsequently pardoned
37
 coming in second in the Presidential derby 
garnering 26% of the votes and eventually winning the post of Manila mayor in 
2013. In a 2004 Transparency International Report, the Philippines acquired the 
dubious distinction of having two ex-Presidents: Ferdinand Marcos and Joseph 
Ejercito Estrada
38
 as members of the notorious 10 most corrupt leaders
39
. It is 
also worth mentioning that ex-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was charged 
with the grave offence of plunder and was put under house arrest for several 
years for alleged misuse of the Philippine Charity and Sweepstakes Office 
(PCSO) funds
40
. In July 2016, the Philippine Supreme Court dismissed the 
plunder case against Arroyo in relation to the PCSO scandal. It must be pointed 
out that of the current sitting judges of the Philippine Supreme Court, “9 of the 
15 were her appointees”41. Ex-President Arroyo who ran during the same May 
2010 elections and emerged victorious as a representative of the second district 
of San Fernando City in the country’s north but who spent the last six years 
under house arrest has recently been elevated to the position of deputy Speaker 
of the House of Representatives
42
. Is it possible to consider that in a Philippine 
context voters are “simply not discerning enough to be able to reasonably and 
rationally evaluate government”43 as posited by some scholars? It seems to be 
the case that in the Philippines; allegations of corruption do not inhibit candidates 
from winning elections. Was the electoral engineering reform initiative, driven 
primarily by automation of elections, successful? This article purports that like 
most elections in the Philippines – it has been a paradoxical experience. 
 
 
Theoretical Framework:  
Interrogating Dominant Patron-Client Theories 
 
Viewing Philippine politics from a predominantly patron-client 
paradigm can be attributed to Carl Lande who conducted groundbreaking work 
                                               
37  Tetch Torres, "Estrada Gulity of Plunder; Perjury Rap Dropped", Inquirer.net, 9 Sept.  
2007. 
38  It must be noted that in the Philippine local elections for 2013, the convicted and 
pardoned Estrada won the vote for Mayor of the capital city of the Philippines – Manila. 
39  Robin Hodess et al., "Global Corruption Report 2004", London, Pluto Press, 2004. 
40  Leila Salaverria, "Arroyo Charged with Plunder in Misuse of Pcso Funds", Inquirer.net, 
17 July 2012. 
41  Reynaldo Santos, "What Has Happened to the Arroyo Plunder Case?",  Rappler: In-
Depth, 2016, http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/119812-gloria-arroyo-plunder-
case-supreme-court. 
42  Marc Cayabyab, "Arroyo Now a Deputy Speaker", Inquirer.net, 10 August 2016. 
43  Shaun Bowler and Jeffrey Karp, "Politicians, Scandals, and Trust in Government," 
Political Behavior, vol. 26, no. 3, 2004. 
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on the idiosyncrasies of Philippine electoral politics
44
. Contemporary analysis 
of Philippine politics has been reduced somewhat into a dominant “patron-
client” paradigm. Lemarchand and Legg extended the analysis by highlighting 
more expansive clientage networks involving “an aggregate of role sets, serially 
linked in such a way that a patron also stands in the position of a client toward 
his superior.”45 The epitome of these patron-client and clientage networks is the 
persistence of political dynasty.  
The Philippines plurality-rule electoral system and the consequent 
characteristics of political parties differ from the “two-ballot majority system” 
that produces relatively secure multiparty alliances
46
. Due to the fluid nature of 
the Philippine electoral contests shaped by term-limitations – described as 
“mechanical effects” and driven by elite interests – elaborated upon as 
“psychological factors”47 political parties are fragmented. Unlike most electoral 
systems in the developed Western world which have historically-rich, 
institutionalized systems with clear party lines or even “bipolar multipartism” as 
envisioned by Duverger
48
, the Philippines typifies unstable coalitions. The 
fragmented Philippine electoral system continues to be a paradox since most of 
its features such as individual ballot structure (personal vote); pre-determined 
and low district magnitudes particularly for Congress and a reformed electoral 
formula represented by term limitations designed to limit incumbency 
advantage are key ingredients of electoral systems that are effective in deterring 
corruption
49
. Yet despite these, Philippine elections and its party system are still 
inherently fragmented, unstable and prone to corruption.  
Notwithstanding its fragmented nature, Philippine elections have also 
seen the emergence of fresh political players. Media, or what Diamond 
describes as a form of “liberation technology”50 has made its unmistakable 
presence felt in Philippine politics. As early as the 1998 Presidential contests 
and in the 2007 national elections, the potent influence of media has visibly 
                                               
44  Carl Lande, Leaders, Factions and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics, 
Monograph Series No. 6, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, Monograph Series, 
New Haven, Yale University Press, 1965. 
45  Rene Lemarchand and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development: A 
Preliminary Analysis", Comparative Politics, vol. 4, no. 2, 1972. 
46  Maurice Duverger, "Duverger's Law: Forty Years Later", in Electoral Laws and Their 
Political Consequences, ed. B. Grofman and A. Lijphart, Riverside Drive, NY, Algora 
Publishing, 2003, p. 70. 
47  Kenneth Benoit, "Duverger's Law and the Study of Electoral Systems", French Politics, 
vol. no. 4, 2006, p. 72. 
48  Maurice Duverger, "Duverger's Law: Forty … cit.", p. 83. 
49  Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini, and Francesco Trebbi, "Electoral Rules and 
Corruption", Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 1, no. 4, 2003. 
50  Larry Diamond, "Liberation Technology," Journal of Democracy, vol. 21, no. 3, 2010, 
p. 69. 
Corruption, Automation Reforms, Patron-Client Networks and New Media  251 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVIII no. 2  2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
grown
51
. The 2010 elections saw the explosion of online journalism, which 
provided a broader and more in-depth access to the population
52
. Coronel points 
out that modern day elections have become a battleground for political aspirants 
who “make their appeal and propagate their messages through the media”53. 
Alongside, media, Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) have also played a 
key role in the safeguarding of elections and more importantly in the exercise of 
militant democracy in the country
54
. Another key player in the evolving 
democratic characteristic of the Philippines is without doubt the Catholic 
Church, which has been described as “one big NGO”55. Contrary to a modernist 
viewpoint that suggests Philippine elections is at a period of transition moving 
towards a more consolidated elite-dominated democratic form, this inquiry 
argues that greater analytical illumination is achieved by interrogating this 
phenomenon as it is: unpredictable and paradoxical and very much a product of 
its unique context. 
The literature on elections and campaign finance reform is replete with 
various accounts of the impact of corruption on the vote. Taking note of the 
unique Philippine presidential electoral system and the nationally elected 
Senators and members of Congress; one sees Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman’s 
prediction: proportional representation systems together with presidentialism 
are associated with higher levels of corrupt political rent-seeking
56
. 
Furthermore, this unpredictability favours “electoral uncertainty” which 
consequently “encourages politicians to corruption activities under electoral 
                                               
51  For more information, see Rey Rosales and Dennis Lowry, "Online News Framing: A 
Content Analysis of the Coverage of Three Manila Online Newspapers During the 1998 
Philippine Presidential Election," Journal of Asian Pacific Communication, vol. 10, no. 1 
(2000); and Kavita Karan, Jacques Gimeno, and Edson Tandoc, "The Internet and Mobile 
Technologies in Election Campaigns: The Gabriela Women's Party During the 2007 
Philippine Elections", Journal of Information Technology & Politics, vol. 6, no. 3-4, 
2009. 
52  CMFR., "Online Coverage of 2010 Elections: Citizen Journalists at Work.", 2010, 
http://cmfr-phil.org/mediaandelections/2010-elections/online-coverage-of-2010-elections-
citizen-journalists-at-work-2/. 
53  Sheila Coronel, "The Role of Media in Deepening Democracy", 2001, p. 13. 
54  The work of Clarke highlights the importance of NGOs in democratisation in Asia and 
more specifically in the Philippines. For more information, see Gerald Clarke, The 
Politics of Ngos in Southeast Asia: Participation and Protest in the Philippines, 
Routledge, New York, 2006. 
55  Coeli Barry, "The Limits of Conservative Church Reformisn Int He Democratic 
Philippines", in Religious Organizations and Democratization: Case Studies from 
Contemporary Asia, ed. Tun-Jen Cheng and Deborah Brown, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 
2015, p. 158. 
56  Jana Kunicova and Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures 
as Constraints on Corruption", British Journal of Political Science, vol. 35, 2006. 
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systems that are dominated by the personal vote”57. The systemic nature of 
corruption permeating Philippine contexts and the nature and operating system 
of voting contribute to the persistence of electoral distortions.  
Reflecting on the May 2010 Philippine elections that saw stunning 
victories of relatives of the late-President Marcos, judged by history as a corrupt 
and autocratic despot, and the second-place finish of ex-President Estrada, 
convicted of corruption and plunder (and subsequently granted a Presidential 
pardon) – one sees how political corruption is inimitably intertwined in 
Philippine elections. Scholars and practitioners have argued that one powerful 
reason for the presence of such a phenomenon is that “political corruption 
becomes a necessary evil” as a result of “fierce competition for campaign 
funds”58. But is the necessary evil so compelling as to prevent voters from 
penalizing corrupt candidates and rewarding honest and hardworking ones? The 
return to power of the Marcoses and the impressive electoral resurgence of 
Estrada seem to indicate that corrupt candidates are rewarded and not penalized. 
Or could the victories of candidates convicted of corruption be due to voter 
ignorance and misperception; or perhaps the voters were benefiting from 
patron-client relations consistent with implicit trading theories or it may just be 
that they were not venal voters and that electoral retribution was not high in 
their agenda?
59
 In a Philippine context with systemic corruption and electoral 
distortion; it can be argued that the voting choice is complex: 
 
Alleged corruption is, in fact, only one of many factors that voters consider when 
casting their ballot. The “trading” argument… is able to explain why so many allegedly 
corrupt candidates do win, contrary to the hopes and expectations of ancient and modern 
theorists of democracy, yet it does not assume that all or most voters are venally looking after 
their own interests. Instead, it argues that a charge of corruption is only one factor that a 
rational voter will take into account; if the allegedly corrupt act was minor and the candidate 
has other, overriding virtues in the voters’ eyes, such as appropriate stands on the issues and 
the right party affiliation, then the act will be ignored or rationalized away60.  
 
 
The Philippine Political Culture 
 
David questions the vise-like grip that “Philippine values” has on 
politics and society. He underscores the prevailing cultural essentialism 
permeating the language of political studies in the country. David identifies the 
                                               
57  Eric Chang, "Electoral Incentives for Political Corruption under Open List Proportional 
Representation", The Journal of Politics, vol. 67, no. 3, 2005, p. 719. 
58  Ibidem, p. 716. 
59  John Peters and Susan Welch, "The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior 
in Congressional Elections", The American Political Science Review, vol. 74, no. 3, 1980. 
60  Ibidem, p. 706. 
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pitfalls of development studies from a Philippine sociological perspective and 
suggests the need to disassociate scholarship from prevailing stereotypical 
strains in order for genuine Philippine development studies to flourish
61
. Ileto 
and his admonitions of an analysis of Philippine history and politics trapped in a 
modernist “concept of development”—echoes points raised by David—and is 
another voice demanding a critical re-examination. Ileto’s arguments are highly 
instructive and form an integral source serving as a lynchpin for the proposed 
analytical framework of this inquiry. He reiterates the almost ubiquitous 
influence of what he describes as a flawed “concept of development” that by 
itself is “trapped” in a modernist discourse62. Critiquing the overriding scope of 
patron-client language on political culture, he laments how “Lande’s 1965 classic 
continues to haunt subsequent texts, including those that seek to debunk it.” He 
challenges present scholarship and proposes opening up a “new path in Philippine 
political studies” that are divorced from subject positionings of individuals63. 
 
 
Electoral Reforms And Corruption: Changes And Continuities 
 
Is there any basis in making claims about the continuities of patron-client 
linkages in the Philippines? In attempting to test this hypothesis Rivera 
conducted an empirical analysis of Philippine politics and discovered that “not 
surprisingly, the elections between 1987 and 2010 provide a dramatic proof of 
the continuing dominance and resilience of ‘political families’ in the country”64. 
Cook identified what he described as two enduring “structural continuities of 
Philippine politics, corruption scandals,” that has dominated political rhetoric 
“and the reallocation of political energy and focus to the next presidential and 
congressional elections”65. 
This article interrogates patron-client and clientage networks as dominant 
theoretical foundations explaining the nature of corruption and how this exacerbates 
election distortions. The argument of Khan embodies this: “Developing country 
states typically operate through patron-client relationships with key sectors of 
                                               
61  Randolph David, Reflections on Sociology and Philippine Society, Quezon City, 
University of the Philippines Press, 2001. 
62  Reynaldo Ileto, "Outlines of a Nonlinear Emplotment of Philippine History" in The 
Politics of Culture in the Shadow of Capital, ed. L Lowe and D. Lloyd, Durham, NC, 
Duke University Press, 1997, p. 98. 
63  "On Sidel's Response and Bossism in the Philippines", Philippine Political Science 
Journal, vol. 46, no. 23, 2002, p. 170. 
64  Temario Rivera, "In Search of Credible Elections and Parties: The Philippine Paradox", in 
Chasing the Wind: Assessing Philippine Democracy, ed. Felipe. Miranda, et al., Diliman, 
Quezon City, Philippines: Commission on Human Rights, Philippines, 2011, p. 62. 
65  Malcolm Cook, "The Philippines in 2014: The More Things Stay the Same", Southeast 
Asian Affairs, 2015, p. 269. 
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society. State leaderships operate through these networks to implement their 
economic and political strategies and to negotiate change in rights”66. The 
satisfaction of particularistic interests among patrons and clients, which in many 
ways can be interpreted as corrupt activities, complicates Philippine electoral 
distortions dampening attempts at reform. It is the predominance of such 
patron-client and clientage linkages that determine the political nature of 
developing countries – such as the Philippines. 
Patron-client relations as a dominant theory is complemented by the 
paradigm of local chieftains or bossism
67
 and its close kin espousing a 
symbiosis of systemic criminal activities vis-à-vis politics not merely on a local 
but on a national level
68. Ileto, and David’s, theoretical challenge to this 
dominance finds resonance with Quimpo’s contested democracy:  
 
An alternative paradigm of contested democracy is more appropriate in 
explaining Philippine politics today… A contested democracy approach acknowledges 
that colonial and postcolonial elite rule constitutes a single continuous seam in 
Philippine politics yet contends that they are not the only important thread. The fight 
against hierarchical structures – the struggle for independence and for popular 
empowerment or democracy from below – is the other major running thread69.  
 
This inquiry posits that a more nuanced appreciation and understanding 
of the nexus of corruption and election reform can be derived by viewing the 
phenomenon from a wider lens that accommodates dominant paradigms as well 
as localised contestations of democracy. Change or attempted reforms in the 
electoral system is heavily influenced by Continuities exemplified by persistent 
electoral distortions.  
 
 
The May 2010 Automated Elections: An Exploratory Analysis 
 
How successful indeed was the first ever synchronized automated 
election
70 
in the Philippines? The speed of the counting of votes, their 
transmission and the rapidness of counting election results were unheard of in 
                                               
66  Mushtaq Khan, "The Efficiency Implications of Corruption," Journal of International 
Development, vol. 8, no. 5, 1996, p. 692. 
67  John Sidel, Capital, Coercion and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines, California, Stanford 
University Press, 1999. 
68  Peter Kreuzer, "Philippine Governance: Merging Politics and Crime", in PRIF-Reports, 
no. 93, Frankfurt, Peace Research Instititute Frankfurt, 2009. 
69  Nathan Quimpo, "Review: Oligarchic Patrimonialism, Bossism, Electoral Clientelism, 
and Contested Democracy in the Philippines", Comparative Politics, vol. 37, no. 2, 2005, 
p. 250. 
70  The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) completed the first, nationwide fully 
automated elections –from counting of votes to transmission and counting of election 
returns. 
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Philippine elections. Incredibly, the general populace was already able to 
determine the winners only after one or two days. Previous experiences of long, 
drawn out manual canvassing and allegations of dagdag-bawas
71
 or “vote 
padding” and “vote shaving” irregularities virtually disappeared72. External 
observers commented that the Philippine election exercise was acceptable
73
. 
Moreover, some observers even clearly identified the probable reasons for the 
seeming success: “Philippine elections a success, people should be declared the 
heroes”74. Notwithstanding the apparent success of the automation of the May 
2010 elections, its true impact is still tentative. The history of the eventual 
awarding of the contract for election automation is controversial: Abiding by a 
“new law (Republic Act No. 9369) approved in 2007 that sought the automation 
of elections in the country”, the COMELEC conducted a controversial bidding 
process for the automated election system (AES) for the May 2010 
synchronized national and local election” which was eventually won by 
Smartmatic-TIM after having been “initially disqualified”75.  
Reflecting on the impact of the automation of the May 2010 elections 
given the uncertain nature of this particularly novel electoral reform becomes 
imperative. “Electronic voting is still a relatively young technology and no 
consensus has yet emerged” about how effective and efficient it truly is76. 
Although there have been claims about the advantages of electronic voting 
“such as ease of counting, ease of voting and fraud prevention” evidence about 
all these have yet to be established
77
.  
Five key questions form the central lines of inquiry for this exploration as 
to the purported success of electoral reforms:  
1. Has automated elections fostered genuine political competition?  
2. Or have the entrenched and oftentimes debilitating patron-client 
relations in Philippine elections disappeared or at least minimized 
with automated elections? 
                                               
71  This literally means “to add and to subtract”. Such malpractice was alleged to have 
occurred during the 1995 senatorial elections. 
72  Ambeth Ocampo, "First Case of "Dagdag-Bawas"?", Inquirer.net, 16 June 2007. 
73  Manuel Mogato, "Asian Observers Say Philippine Polls Acceptable", Reuters, 13 May 
2010. 
74  Jerome Aning, Angelo Cabrera, and Dyan Ruiz, "People Heroes in Poll Success, Say 
Foreign Observers", Inquirer.net, 2010, p. 1. 
75  Temairo Rivera, "In Search of … cit.", p. 56. 
76  Jarrett Blanc, "Electronic Voting", in Challenging the Norms and Standards of Election 
Administration, ed. International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Washington, D.C., 
United States Aid Agency (USAID), 2007, p. 11. 
77  Ibidem, p. 12. 
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3.  Does corruption – long been described as systemic78 and its impact on 
elections been curbed or at least checked as a result of the automation?   
4. How has media made an impact on election reforms?   
5. Has support for the automation of elections by the candidates been 
translated to electoral success? 
This exploratory inquiry analyses the first ever synchronized automated 
elections held on May 2010 described as “successful in contributing to 
enhanced public confidence in the electoral process”79. The analysis attempts to 
model possible relationships between the outcome variable and the predictor 
variables.  For purposes of this exploratory case study, the main geographical 
research area is the Philippine’s National Capital Region (NCR). NCR is the 
smallest of the nation’s administrative regions, the most populous and serves as 
the seat of the national government making it the focal concentration point of 
economic, social and political activities in the Philippines. The population of 
NCR is around 10.7 million and it is classified as a 100% urban region
80
.  
The outcome variable is the electoral votes won by candidates (Votes). 
These figures have been compiled from the official election returns available 
from the COMELE
81
. The predictor variables are classified into two types: 
continuous and categorical (dummy) variables. The continuous variable is: The 
level of news report (NewsReport) coverage by mainstream media over a 
limited time period during the campaign of the candidates compiled for this 
inquiry
82
; The categorical (dummy) variables are: Allegations of corruption 
(CorrCharge)
83
 compiled from the official records of the Philippines’ House of 
Representatives and the Senate of the Philippines
84
; Whether the candidates 
                                               
78  Ledivina Cariño, G. Iglesias, and M. Mendoza, "Initiatives Taken against Corruption: The 
Philippine Case", in Programme for Accountability and Transparency (PACT) of the 
Management Development and Governance Division, United Nations Development 
Programme, 1998. 
79  Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), "International Election Observation 
Mission Philippines National and Local Elections 2010 Interim Report", Bangkok, Asian 
Network for Free Elections, 2010, p. 9. 
80  Maria Corazon De la Paz and Lisa Colson, "Population, Health and Environment Issues in 
the Philippines", in A Profile of the National Capital Region, Washington, D.C., 
Population Reference Bureau, 2008. 
81  Commission on Elections, "Automation of the 2010 National and Local Elections", 2010, 
http://www.comelec.gov.ph/modernization/2010_natl_local/automation_timelines.html. 
82  Che De los Reyes, "Pre-Campaign Clutter or Spin Central? War on the Air Waves: 6 Top 
Bets Spend P1b on 'Pol Ads'", in Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, Quezon 
City, Philippines, Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2010. 
83  This inquiry is exploratory in nature. Thus it is aware of the possibility of misidentifying 
confounding factors with the use of dummy variables as pointed out by other scholars and 
practitioners. See Bowler and Karp, "Politicians, Scandals, and Trust in Government". 
84  PulseAsia, "Pulse Asia's January 2010 Pre-Election Survey: Trust Ratings of Selected 
Public Figures and Groups and Electoral Endorsements for President in the May 2010 
Elections", Quezon City, Philippines, Pulse Asia, Inc., 2010. 
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were running for re-election (Re-election) compiled from official records of the 
Philippines’ House of Representatives;85The regional affiliation (i.e. Luzon, 
Visayas or Mindanao) of the candidates (Region) compiled from the 
Philippines’ House of Representatives86; Whether the candidates belonged to 
Political Dynasties (Dynasties) as culled from various sources
87
; Moreover, this 
inquiry adopts Rivera’s definition of membership of political dynasty as a 
candidate who belongs to “a political family” which has “at least two members 
of the same family (typically up to the third degree of consanguinity) having 
won a congressional and/or gubernatorial seat between 1987 and 2010”88; The 
candidates political party affiliation (i.e. Incumbent Party, Opposition Party or 
Other parties) represented by (Party) as culled from campaign materials of the 
candidates
89
 and; The level of support or non-support of the Candidates towards 
the Automation of Elections (Automation) as compiled from candidates platforms 
as well from the Catholic Bishops Conference Elections Watch documents
90
. 
This exploration hypothesizes that votes garnered by the senatorial 
candidates (Votes) is a dependent variable resulting from the interplay of the 
main independent variables pertaining to (a) features of the election system 
itself and (b) allegations of corruption. This will be shown by using multiple 
regressions, which aim to derive a mathematical equation or an estimated 
regression line, depicting significant relationships between independent and 
the dependent variables. This inquiry recognizes that multiple regressions are 
at best an indication of correlations that exist between key variables. Causal 
relationships or whether or not the independent variables in this inquiry cause 
changes in the dependent variable can best be achieved by conducting 
experiments (or quasi-experiments). For this exploratory inquiry, what is being 
attempted is primarily a cross-sectional, correlational study. 
 
 
 
                                               
85  House of Representatives, "Member Information - 14th Congress", in House of 
Representatives, 14th Congress, Quezon City, Philippines, Information and 
Communications Technology Service, 2010. 
86  Ibidem. 
87  Sheila Coronel, "The Seven Ms of Dynasty Building", in Philippine Center for 
Investigative Journalism, Quezon City, Philippines, Philippine Center for Investigative 
Journalism, 2007; Ernesto Dal Bo, Pedro Dal Bo, and Jason Snyder, "Political Dynasties", 
in NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 13122, Cambridge, MA, National Bureau 
of Economic Research, 2007; Temario. Rivera, "Landlords and Capitalists: Class, Family, 
and State in Philippine Manufacturing", Quezon City, Philippines, University of the 
Philippines Press and Philippine Center for Policy Studies, 1994. 
88  Temaira Rivera, "In Search of … cit.", p. 61. 
89  House of Representatives, "Member Information - 14th Congress". 
90  Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP). "Election 2010", ed. National 
Secretariat for Social Action Justice And Peace, Manila, Philippines, CBCP, 2010. 
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This is represented in the hypothesised formula below: 
 
yOUTPUT
t 
= α + ϕ ELECTION + κ CORRUPTION + μ
t  
 
In specific hypothesised terms:  
yOUTPUT
t 
= α + λX
1 
+ χX
2 
+ σX
3 
+ δX
4 
+ εX
5 
+ φX
6 
+ φX
7 
+ μ
t 
 
The indicators used for this analysis are: 
OUTPUT – Votes – A continuous variable denoting official votes garnered 
during the May 2010 Automated elections. This variable underwent log 
transformation
91
 in order to fulfill conditions of data analysis
92
.  
X1 – Re-election – A dummy variable representing whether candidate is running 
for re-election (1) or not (0). 
X2 – Political Party – A dummy variable representing the Political Party 
affiliation of the candidate
93
. 
X3 – Region – A dummy variable representing the Regional affiliation
94
 of the 
candidate (Ando, 1969). 
X4 – Dynasty – A dummy variable representing whether the candidate is a 
member of a political dynasty (1) or not (0). 
X5 – CorrCharge – Documented allegations of corruption filed against the 
candidate before the courts (1) or if no allegation nor cases filed (0). 
X6 – NewsReport – A continuous variable measuring the amount of exclusive 
news coverage by mainstream media
95
 during the campaign period
96
. 
                                               
91  The dependent variable “Votes” is a continuous variable that ran up to the millions (eight 
to seven digit figures), whereas some of the independent variables are dichotomous (i.e. 
membership in a political dynasty, allegations of corruption). Because of this, the raw data 
proved to be highly-skewed. Employing the log transformation was able to overcome the 
skewness and allowed for better handling of the data. 
92  Peter Hall, "On the Removal of Skewness by Transformation", Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society Series B (Methodological), vol. 54, no. 1, 1992. 
93  The incumbent party refers to the party-in-power during the 2010 elections. Party 1 
referred to (Lakas-KAMPI) while Party 2 and 3 refer to Liberal Party and Other 
Accredited Major Parties (i.e. NP, NPC, LDP, PMP, PDP-Laban). 
94  The seminal work of Ando “the Study of Voting Patterns in the Philippine Presidential 
and Senatorial Elections, 1946-1965” makes claims that given three variables: (1) political 
party, (2) socio-economic status and (3) cultural-linguistic-affiliation, the third is the most 
powerful predictor. Since this proposed manuscript looks into voting patterns, it was 
necessary to test earlier theoretical positions in relation to variables that predicted votes. 
95  The NewsReport variable comes mainly from the CMFR 2010 report. The mainstream 
media reported in the CMFR report pertained primarily to TV stations. The “exclusive” 
adjective refers to news items that pertain directly to the candidates during the elections 
and not about other related news items. Moreover, the period that was monitored by the 
CMFR only covered from February 9, 2010 (the official start of the campaign period) till 
the February 26, 2010. 
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X7 – Support for Automation Law – A dummy variable representing the 
candidate’s support (or non-support) of the Automation Law for the Elections. 
 
Abramovitz et al. reported a strong relation between incumbency and re-
election rates, results of this inquiry support this finding
97
. Also, Stewart and 
Clarke hypothesized strong effects of leader images on party choice, results of 
this inquiry contribute to this ongoing discussion
98
. Dal Bo et al. reported on the 
self-perpetuating characteristics of political dynasties, results of this inquiry 
reinforce these arguments
99
. Villanueva concludes that corruption is an 
entrenched and necessary feature of Philippine elections, this inquiry partially 
acknowledges this notion
100
. Petersson et al. reported on the importance of 
media in Swedish elections, results from this inquiry give credence to some of 
their conclusions
101
. The five key questions earlier identified will now be 
addressed in this section. 
 
 
Discussion And Results 
 
One of the fundamental questions raised in this exploratory inquiry was 
whether or not the automation of elections fostered genuine political 
competition, defined in this exploratory inquiry as free (voters can exercise their 
right and are not coerced in any way) and fair (parties compete on a level 
playing field). For this exploratory inquiry, comparisons of actual voter turnout 
from 2004 till 2013, are presented in Table 2. Introducing automation of 
elections in 2010 seemed to have resulted to an increase in participation among 
the voting population with a jump in voter turn-out (74.98%) and also with the 
voter age population turn-out (64.70%).  The Effective Number of Electoral 
Parties (ENEP)
102
 has also maintained its moderate score (6.56) for the 2010 
                                                                                                                   
96  CMFR, "The Cmfr Monitor of Media Coverage of the 2010 Elections," no. Government 
TV covered Teodoro most, ignored bottom dwellers (2010), http://www.cmfr-
phil.org/2010/03/18/government-tv-covered-teodoro-most-ignored-bottom-dwellers/. 
97  Alan Abramowitz, Brad Alexander, and Matthew Gunning, "Incumbency, Redistricting 
and the Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections", The Journal of Politics, vol. 68, 
no. 1, 2006. 
98  Marianne Stewart and Harold Clark, "The (Un)Importance of Party Leaders: Leader 
Images And Party Choice in the 1987 British Election", The Journal of Politics, Vol. 54, 
No. 2 (May, 1992), pp. 447-470. 
99  Ernesto Dal Bo, Pedro Dal Bo, and Jason Snyder, "Political Dynasties … cit.". 
100  Luisito Villanueva, "Philippine Electoral Distortion … cit.". 
101  Olof Petersson et al., "Media and Elections in Sweden", in Report from the Democratic 
Audit of Sweden 2006, Stockholm: SNS-Centre for Business and Policy Studies, 2006. 
102  Pippa Norris, Electoral Engineering: Voting … cit., p. 83. 
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elections. This inquiry contends that the automation of elections has not 
dampened political competition (narrowly defined in this study).  
 
Table no. 2. Voter Turn-out for Senate from 2001-2013 
Year 
Registered 
Voters 
Actual 
Votes 
Voter 
Turn-
out % 
Voting Age 
Population (VAP) 
Turnout % 
(Voter turnout as 
defined by the 
percentage of the 
voting age 
population that 
actually voted) 
Effective 
Number of 
Electoral 
Parties (ENEP) 
for the Senate 
2013 52,014,648 31,571,930 60.70 
50.58 6.52 
2010 50,896,164 38,162,985 74.98 
64.70 6.56 
2007 45,453,236 28,945,710 63.68 
54.87 7.56 
2004 43,536,028 13,241,974 30.42 
27.18 3.98 
Source: (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). 
2015) 
 
Do winning votes and the institutional features of the electoral exercise 
have effects that are independent of one another? Are there other variables that 
affect winning of votes? As can be seen in Table 3, Model I reports that 
predictors with significant coefficients were Re-election (= .429, p < .001), 
Political Party Membership, broken down into membership in the non- 
dominant minority party 2 ( = .389, p < .001) and other accredited parties – 
party 3 (= .401, p < .001) and Regional affiliation of the candidate, broken 
down into Region 1 (Luzon) (= .318, p < .01), Region 2 (Visayas) (= .276, p 
< .05) and Region 3 (Mindanao) (= .281, p < .01). What happens if 
candidates’ membership to a political dynasty as a dummy variable is included 
in the analysis? Model II presents what would happen if affiliation to a political 
dynasty and allegations of corruption were added. Results indicate that only the 
net effect of political dynasty was substantial and significant (= .251, p < .05). 
Has corruption been curbed or at least checked as a result of the 
automation? The net effect of allegations of corruption (= .442, p > .05) was 
not significant. Model II suggests that the net effects of political dynasty 
membership are substantial but are largely independent of allegations of 
corruption. This provides evidence of how political dynasties are entrenched in 
electoral exercises and are largely seen as different from corruption. In addition, 
Model II explained roughly 66% of the variance of winning votes in the NCR, 
so that the additional variable is not a trivial predictor of votes.  
How has media made an impact on election reforms? Would significant 
net effects of re-election, political party membership, regional affiliation and 
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dynasty hold up with the addition of another control variable? The best 
candidate for such a test is an indicator of media exposure. Model III generated 
significant effects for the additional variable of media exposure or NewsReport 
(= .371, p < .001). Similar to Model II, the net effect of allegations of 
corruption was not significant and the same goes for regional affiliation whose 
net effect moderated by news report was no longer significant. Unlike the 
Presidential elections where there is no possibility of re-election, senators can 
run for re-election provided that they do not serve for more than two 
consecutive terms. This explains the strong presence of the predictor “Re-
election” or the incumbency advantage. Moreover, the model now explained 
roughly 78% of the variance of Senatorial voting outcomes in the NCR. 
In what concerns the question: Has support for election automation been 
translated to electoral success? Would the persistent significant net effects of re-
election, political party membership, dynasty and news report coverage hold up 
with the addition of one more control variable? This inquiry includes a dummy 
variable representing the Senatorial candidates’ support (or non-support) for the 
automation bill as a final control variable. This model generated significant 
effects for four key variables in the analysis: Re-election ( = .253, p <.001); 
Political Party membership, Party2 ( = .267, p <.001); (Dynasty ( = .292, p 
< .001) and NewsReport (= .358, p < .001). Allegations of corruption and 
candidates’ support for automation were not significant. A closer inspection of 
the magnitudes of the standardised coefficients indicates that NewsReport had 
the highest impact while re-election had the least. This seems to reinforce the 
arguments that the “fourth estate” or media as a key factor in election exercises 
is gaining prominence. More importantly, Model IV explained approximately 
78% of the variance of winning votes in the NCR. The addition of the final 
control variable of support or non-support for automation is not an 
inconsequential predictor of votes.  
One of the issues that could compromise the analytical power of 
regressions is the existence of multicollinearity. Statisticians and social science 
researchers repeatedly caution about the detection and awareness of the 
“adverse effects of multicollinearity” and how relationships arising from 
regressions with this condition prove highly unreliable and problematic
103
. One 
of the most common tests employed in detecting multicollinearity is the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF): Specifically, a VIF of “10 or even as low as 4 
(equivalent to a tolerance level of 0.10 or 0.25)” indicate the presence of 
unwarranted or severe multicollinearity
104
. Tests to detect multicollinearity on 
Model IV, reveal that the highest VIF recorded for the coefficients is 9.65 
which corresponds to the Independent Variable “Allegations of Corruption”. All 
other VIF statistics of the model coefficients are well below the 4.0 threshold. 
                                               
103  Edward Mansfield and Billy Helms", Detecting Multicollinearity," The American 
Statistician, vol. 36, no. 3a, 1982, p.158. 
104  Robert O'Brien, "A Caution Regarding Rules of Thumb for Variance Inflation Factors", 
Quality & Quantity, vol.41, no.5, 2007, p.  674. 
Table no. 3. Linear Regression on Senatorial Candidates 
(from voters residing in the National Capital Region) (N=60) 
Dependent Variable: Number of Votes per Candidate 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Variable  B  SE B   B  SE B   B  SE( B)   B  SE( B)  
Constant  10.252 .390  10.332  .364  10.482 .299  10.653 .354  
Re-election 1.403 .303 .429*** .891 .326 .273** .912 .262 .279*** .827 .276 .253*** 
Political Party             
  Party1 .893 .542 .164 .466 .520 .086 -.144 .441 -.026 -.324 .474 -.059 
  Party2 1.703 .429 .389*** 1.564 .424 .357** 1.300 .354 .297*** 1.170 .378 .267*** 
  Party3 1.478 .365 .401*** .980 .372 .266** .367 .327 .100 .269 .352 .073 
Region             
  Region1 1.100 .457 .318** 1.023 .429 .296* .663 .358 .192 .620 .367 .179 
  Region2 .981 .489 .276* .914 .456 .257* .357 .392 .100 .337 .401 .095 
  Region3 1.085 .473 .281** .909 .451 .236* .729 .367 .189 .690 .371 .179 
Dynasty    .847 .339 .251* .991 .300 .296*** .977 .303 .292*** 
CorrCharge    .744 .442 .170 .321 .370 .073 .426 .392 .097 
NewsReport       .189  .371*** .183 .046 .358*** 
Automation (No 
Support) 
         -.254 .301 -.072 
Automation (Full 
Support )
 
         .165 .309 .043 
             
R
2
  .597   .666   .782   .788  
F for change in 
R
2
 
 11.22**
* 
  11.296*
** 
  17.926*
** 
  14.839*
** 
 
*p <.05, ** p <.01, ***p <.001 
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Conclusions:  
The Impact Of The Philippine Electoral Reform Experiences 
 
The exploratory inquiry purports that adopting a perspective recognizing 
changes and continuities in political culture and processes of the recent 
automation of elections in the Philippines would be analytically illuminating. 
Using an analytical framework that assumes pendulum swings from entrenched 
practices (i.e. continuities of patron-client networks) and attempts at change (i.e. 
transformations such as the electoral automation) and reinforcing these with 
findings from the naïve and exploratory models proposed in this inquiry; 
provides a more nuanced perspective of the 2010 elections. 
In what concerns the continuities, regression analyses indicated that 
allegations of corruption are predictors that are largely independent of the 
outcome of votes suggesting that the electorate is indifferent about allegations 
of corruption as key considerations for election loss or victory. One can argue 
that the level of trust of voters towards candidates in a dysfunctional and 
distorted system yields complex results. The Philippine election system 
distortions highlight the prevalence of dysfunctional bureaucratic processes 
epitomized by the COMELEC. A number of laws, statutes and provisions from 
COMELEC prove ineffectual: “these regulations are so stringent that they are 
considered as “dead-letter” provisions that have proven unrealistic or difficult to 
enforce”1. Moreover, these dysfunctions have led to debilitating ambiguity 
where election laws appear grey and untested
2
. Within the interstices of these 
bureaucratic dysfunctions, election actors use whatever means necessary also 
referred to as creative compliance in achieving electoral goals
3
.  
Regression analyses for the Senatorial vote provide a glimpse of how 
dysfunction in the electoral system is compensated by the powerful and 
persistent presence of patron-client relationships. Incumbents or those running 
for re-election perpetuate themselves and their allies in power through the 
strategic and tactical use of patron-client relationships. Presidential candidates 
who ran for the May 2010 elections were supported by the usual few patrons 
present in the Philippine political landscape for centuries
4
. Furthermore, the 
May 2010 automated elections; similar to previous electoral reform efforts 
before it have been consistently hijacked by powerful patron elites: 
                                               
1  Julio Teehankee, "Electoral Politics … cit.", p. 188. 
2  Che De los Reyes and Karol Anne Ilagan, "All Right to Lie, Cheat, Bluff? Election Laws 
Gray, Untested",  Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2010, http://pcij.org/ 
stories/all-right-to-lie-cheat-bluff-election-laws-gray-untested/. 
3  Roel Landingin, "Venture Capitalists or True Believers? Only 308 Donors Funded 
Campaign for Presidency", Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2010,  
http://pcij.org/stories/only-308-donors-funded-campaign-for-presidency/. 
4  Ibidem 
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One important consequence of the blockage of political reform is that a narrow 
set of elite interests has continued to dominate the policy-making process. Consistent and 
aggressive efforts to sideline NGOs from the policy arena have helped guarantee that the 
legislature remains a preserve of the political-economic elite5.  
 
In a distorted election system that has high barriers to popular 
participation and victory measured in huge capital outlays – clientelist linkages 
fuelled by complex patronage determines elections outcomes. Regression 
analysis, particularly the predictor of political dynasty membership for the 
Senatorial vote, provides evidence of how debilitating dysfunction in the 
electoral system is overrun by clientelist linkages. 
The impact of entrenched elites represented by individual candidates with 
very loose political party affiliations has been documented in this exploratory 
study. Scholars and practitioners have reaffirmed that “unfortunately, political 
parties in the Philippines are loose coalitions of personalities and political clans 
organized around clientelistic machines” designed with the sole purpose of 
holding on to or claiming new areas to exert power
6
. Election reforms are 
compromised by the presence of clientelist linkages. It may even be argued that 
as long as clientelist linkages persist electoral reform would be very difficult to 
implement especially in a context where “legislators in the Philippines are largely 
free agents operating independently of the party leaders who, in other democracies 
with stronger parties, might compel the rank-and-file to support political 
reforms”7. This remains one of the remaining puzzles of Philippine politics: 
 
The paradox of Philippine politics and governance is that despite the long 
tradition of institutionalized democratic practices and history of popular struggles, 
Philippine society has engendered an elitist and clientelistic democracy embedded in an 
underdeveloped economy8. 
 
In what concerns the changes, regression analyses seem to indicate that 
the promise of election reform hinges on the role that media plays as well as the 
increasing presence of loosely-coupled networks of stakeholders. Well beyond 
the scope of this inquiry is the impact of new forms of social media (i.e. the 
internet, social networking sites, the Short-Message-System [SMS] or texting 
phenomenon) in strengthening networks among stakeholders. New forms of 
media have gained tremendous popularity, evidence of this is that the 
                                               
5  Kent Eaton, "Restoration or Transformation? … cit.", p. 491. 
6  Ibidem, p. 490. 
7  Ibidem. 
8  Julio Teehankee, "Consolidation or Crisis of Clientelistic Democracy? The 2004 
Synchronized Elections in the Philippines", in Between Consolidation and Crisis 
Elections and Democracy in Five Nations in Southeas Asia, ed. A. Croissant and B. 
Martin, Berlin, Lit Verlag, 2006, p. 215. 
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Philippines is known as the texting capital of the world
9
 and is known for 
having the highest social networking engagement in the Asia-Pacific
10
. 
Widespread examples of volunteerism and citizen participation reported in the 
May 2010 elections bode well for the sustenance of these positive networks. As 
a matter of fact, the May 2010 elections have been “regarded as the highest 
non-partisan elections monitoring since 1980’s, a pioneer in elections 
observation activities in the world”11. The change that the May 2010 elections 
showed was the powerful presence of civil society. It also saw how “political 
parties, the Catholic Church, its affiliates and various advocacy groups – had 
election observers in the room for the entire day to watch the process; a very 
robust process”12. These networks should not be confused as ad hoc movements 
coming and going with every election. Some of them have become successful 
in bringing “non-traditional parties that bring different sectors together”; an 
example of this would be the “Institute for Popular Democracy, a Manila-based 
NGO that has devoted its considerable talents to strengthening the political 
party”13. These networks are an expression of “contested democracy” a 
welcome paradigmatic alternative highlighting “the element of agency, apart 
from contestation” that not only places emphasis on entrenched patron-client 
and clientelist models but also “provides the opportunity for subordinate classes 
and communities to push for popular empowerment”14.  
This exploratory inquiry proposes that in understanding the interplay of 
systemic corruption, the implementation of election reforms and the 
pervasiveness of patron-client networks in a unique Philippine setting – a more 
nuanced perspective may be necessary. A perspective recognizing the co-
existence of debilitating continuities and seemingly effective changes within a 
distorted electoral system can provide some tentative answers to puzzling 
results typical of Philippine elections. This inquiry used a non-experimental 
correlational approach – regressing votes won by candidates with certain key 
independent variables – in order to arrive at models in attempting to explain 
electoral behavior that has resulted from an unprecedented electoral engineering 
initiative – election automation. Preliminary models generated provide some 
                                               
9  Riza Olchondra, "Rp: From Texting Capital to Leader in (Inter) Networking", Philippine 
Daily Inquirer, 20 September 2008. 
10  Sarah Radwanick, "Philippines Exhibits Highest Social Networking Engagement", in 
Social Metworking Habits Vary Considerably Across Asia-Pacific Markets, Singapore, 
comScore, 2010. 
11  Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), "International Election Observation 
Mission Philippines National and Local Elections 2010 Interim Report". 
12  Bill Sweeney, "Reflecting on the Philippine's 1986 and 2010 Elections", 2010, 
http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/News-in-Brief/2010/June/Reflecting-on-the-
Philippines-1986-and-2010-Elections.aspx. 
13  Kent Eaton, "Restoration or Transformation? … cit.", p. 492. 
14  Nathan Quimpo, "Review: Oligarchic Patrimonialism … cit.", p.248. 
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empirical evidence to the argument that viewing Philippine elections primarily 
from the perspective of patron-client networks is insufficient. Complementing this 
with contested democracy as manifested by mainstream news agencies as well as 
an emerging phenomenon of new media, provides fresh theoretical perspectives. 
 
